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Abstract
This article goes beyond the study of speech acts to investigate the process of securitization during a health crisis. The
article introduces the concept of ‘expert-led securitization’ to account for situations when experts dominate the admin-
istrative process that translates a securitizing speech act into extraordinary public policy. Expert-led securitization was
particularly salient during the 2009 pandemic flu in Denmark and Sweden. Autonomous public health expert agencies
led the national securitization processes, and these never included intense political battles or extensive public debates.
In turn, the respective processes resulted in different policies: Sweden’s main response to the pandemic was an extraordi-
nary push to vaccinate its whole population, while Denmark’s was a one-off offer of vaccination to about twenty percent
of its people. Hence, the 2009 pandemic example illustrates the added value of investigating the administrative dynamics
of securitization when seeking to understand differences in extraordinary policies.
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1. Introduction
This article addresses a particular dimension of crisis gov-
ernance, namely the elevation of a crisis to a security
threat. Securitization of crises generates distinct gover-
nance processes as well as policies. Concretely, the ar-
ticle analyses the securitization of the 2009 H1N1 pan-
demic and asks how two similar securitizing speech acts
could nevertheless produce two very different health cri-
sis responses in Denmark and Sweden.
The research on securitization has broadened out
substantially during the last few decades both concep-
tually and empirically (Balzacq, 2005; Stritzel, 2007).
Studies now routinely frame insecurity as something
that can stem from multiple sources rather than solely
from military threats and hostile states. Securitization
can be applied to non-military threats such as migra-
tion (e.g., Robinson, 2017), climate change (e.g., Diez,
Von Lucke, & Wellmann, 2016) and health (Elbe, 2011;
Enemark, 2017; Hanrieder & Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014;
Howell, 2014; Kittelsen, 2013; Roemer-Mahler & Elbe,
2016). Many of these newer studies theorize secu-
ritization to include public administrative processes
and policy decisions, and hence, extend empirical in-
vestigations beyond discourse analysis to include pro-
cess tracing, content analysis, and even ethnographic
research (Abraham, 2011; Enemark, 2017; Hameiri,
2014; Hanrieder & Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014; McInnes &
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 4, Pages 319–330 319
Rushton, 2013; Roemer-Mahler & Elbe, 2016; Watterson
& Kamradt-Scott, 2016).
This article contributes to this emerging literature in
two ways. Conceptually, it reviews existing contributions
and introduces the concept of expert-led securitization
to describe a public administrative mechanism that im-
pacts securitization processes. Expert-led securitization
exhibits three distinct characteristics. First, ‘initiation’:
In line with conventional securitization theory, securiti-
zation of threats is initiated at the political level through
distinct ‘speech acts.’ Second, ‘process’: The ensuing se-
curitization process is primarily driven by field experts
working in key bureaucratic bodies rather than by politi-
cians. Third, ‘policy’: Similar speech acts can be followed
by different policies.
Empirically, the article investigates the national ad-
ministrative dynamics of the 2009 flu (H1N1) pandemic
securitization in two ‘most-similar’ countries, Denmark
and Sweden, with different pandemic response poli-
cies. The article illuminates the role of the expert pub-
lic health agencies’ practices in securitization, emphasiz-
ing the significantly different processes in dealing with
the health threat despite two otherwise similar socioe-
conomic environments.
The article is structured as follows. Firstly, it ar-
gues for analyzing securitization with a focus on admin-
istrative processes, particularly for infectious diseases.
Secondly, it advances the concept of expert-led securi-
tization, which includes three distinguishing character-
istics. Thirdly, the article compares the securitization of
the 2009 H1N1 flu pandemic in Denmark and Sweden,
finding that the three characteristics of expert-led se-
curitization were strongly present in the cases. Notably,
while conventional securitization theory suggests that all
securitization is followed by extraordinary policies, the
analysis here shows that focusing on expert leadership
helps explain how extraordinary measures taken by gov-
ernments really are.
2. Securitization Processes
Political studies often turn to the Copenhagen School
to understand securitization. Within the Copenhagen
School framework, securitization is understood conven-
tionally as the outcome of speech acts that position an
issue as an existential threat (Buzan, Wæver, & DeWilde,
1998; Wæver, 1995). This discursive act of securitization
involves several steps. First, political leaders frame a par-
ticular issue as an existential threat. Second, this framing
needs to be accepted by the relevant audience. Third,
this acceptance suspends ‘normal politics’ by legitimiz-
ing extraordinary emergency measures (Balzacq, 2005;
McDonald, 2008). Extraordinary measures include gov-
ernment authorities taking any action that they deem
necessary to curb the threat, such as claiming additional
budgetary resources, censoring information, launching
military operations, and restraining civil liberties. The fo-
cus on speech acts has proven to be a potent analyti-
cal tool for understanding the initiation of securitization,
usually by political leaders in high-politics settings (inter-
national summits, speeches, parliamentary debates, and
so on). Analyses of speech acts often illuminate when is-
sues move from being normal to being framed as secu-
rity threats. For conventional securitization theory, the
discursive build-up and acceptance of an issue as a secu-
rity threat is what constitutes the process of securitiza-
tion. As Abraham (2011, p. 799) notes: “A speech act is
the moment that securitization occurs.”
In this article, however, we join the many scholars
who have extended the process of securitization beyond
speech acts to also encompass bureaucratic dynamics
(Balzacq, 2010; Balzacq & Guzzini, 2015; Hameiri, 2014;
McDonald, 2008; McInnes & Rushton, 2013; Stritzel,
2007). This ‘process’ approach has been particularly
salient in analyses of non-military threats such as surges
in migration, climate change, and public health crises.
These studies have abandoned the exclusive focus on
speech acts and audience acceptance to analyze what
happens to policymaking after securitizing speech acts.
Looking at securitization only as series of speech acts can
exclude important administrative and policy implications
that help constitute and provide meaning to securitiza-
tion (McDonald, 2008). Stritzel (2007, p. 377) argues that
“the speech act itself i.e., literarily a single security artic-
ulation at a particular point in time, will at best only very
rarely explain the entire social process that follows from
it.” Thus, it should be clear that speech acts can influ-
ence the management of a threat and the process of se-
curitization. However, it does not determine the process
of securitization. While analyses of speech acts highlight
whether the process of securitization has been initiated,
analyses of administrative dynamics can uncover how se-
curitization processes manifest themselves.
The founding scholars of Copenhagen School se-
curitization theory were actually attentive to the ex-
istence of bureaucratic dynamics, although these re-
mained theoretically underdeveloped and analytically
underutilized at the time. One of the earliest and most
prominent Copenhagen School works on securitization,
Buzan et al.’s (1998) Security: A New Framework for
Analysis, referred to a category of ‘functional actors’ that
did not include the principal actors initiating the securi-
tization process (the securitizing actors) but that never-
theless significantly influenced decisions in the field of
security (Buzan et al., 1998). In the case of military se-
curity, these functional actors could be “subunits within
the state that are of interest in military security terms ei-
ther because of an ability to shape themilitary or foreign
policy of the state or because they have the capability to
take autonomous action” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 36). But
this important work of the Copenhagen School, together
with many of the earlier Copenhagen School works (e.g.,
Buzan, 1997; Wæver, 1995), did not pursue this bureau-
cratic political perspective further. The functional actors
were only referred to in passing on two occasions. A pol-
luting company was described as a potential functional
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actor in the context of environmental security, and in the
context of military security, potential functional actors
were described as assassins, mercenary companies, de-
fense bureaucracies and the arms industry. Hence, both
conceptually and empirically, functional actors in the
Copenhagen School appear to have been included some-
what cursorily. Studies interested in the bureaucratic dy-
namics of securitization, therefore, have turned to pub-
lic administration and policy theory to gain other insights
into securitization.
In the case comparison that we present, conven-
tional securitization theory has difficulties explaining
how similar speech acts and levels of acceptance can re-
sult in two different responses: In one country the re-
sponse was arguably highly extraordinary while the re-
sponse was far more in line with normal politics in the
other. We posit that a securitization process perspec-
tive, which incorporates bureaucratic practices, better
explains the diversity of policy outcomes.
2.1. Securitization Processes in Cases of Pandemics
Key studies have applied securitization theory to con-
crete cases of health threats in the form of infectious dis-
ease epidemics (Abraham, 2011; Bengtsson & Rhinard,
2019; De Bengy Puyvallée & Kittelsen, 2019; Enemark,
2017; Hameiri, 2014; Hanrieder & Kreuder-Sonnen,
2014; McInnes & Rushton, 2013; Roemer-Mahler & Elbe,
2016; Watterson & Kamradt-Scott, 2016). In line with
the process approach to explaining securitization, these
studies all show that administrative processes can have
decisive impacts on securitization. An often-used exam-
ple of successful securitization of a health threat is the
unanimous UN Security Council resolution 1308 from
2000, which concluded that HIV/AIDS posed a risk to
stability and security (e.g., Altman, 2003). On close in-
spection, however, McInnes and Rushton (2013) found
that many states never implemented extraordinary mea-
sures against HIV/AIDS, and that administrative and pol-
icy implications differed substantially between countries
despite all responding to the same act of securitiza-
tion. Hameiri’s (2014) study of Indonesian health se-
curity politics related to the H5N1 avian influenza in
2005 also underscored administrative processes, namely
the Indonesian Ministry of Health’s bureaucratic in-
terest in halting a growing fragmentation of respon-
sibility and leakage of funds to other state and non-
state agencies. In another study of H5N1 securitization,
Curley and Herington (2011) found that the securitiza-
tion in Vietnam and Indonesia was shaped by adminis-
trative processes rather than by peak-level speech acts.
Applying a collective securitization approach to the study
of the EU, Bengtsson and Rhinard 2019 similarly con-
clude that networks and bureaucratic actors played a
key role in shaping the processes and responses to large-
scale transnational health threats. These studies and oth-
ers (Enemark, 2017; Roemer-Mahler & Elbe, 2016) show
empirically that including the administrative level can
matter when investigating securitization of public health
issues. Yet missing from this literature are clear concep-
tual lessons drawn from the analyzed cases. Hence, we
add to the conceptual understanding by identifying and
characterizing a particular securitization process, namely
expert-led securitization.
2.2. Expert-Led Securitization
Expert-led securitization occurs when experts dominate
an administrative process that translates a securitizing
speech act into extraordinary public policy. The con-
cept of expert-led securitization builds on Elbe’s impor-
tant contribution referring to the ‘medicalization of se-
curity’ as well as the ‘pharmaceuticalisation of security’
(Elbe, 2011, 2012). Elbe (2011) traces the medicaliza-
tion of security to three contemporary security practices:
(i) Security issues are increasingly being framed in med-
ical terms; (ii) medical and public health experts play a
much greater role in security policies; and (iii) pharma-
cological interventions (rather than traditional military
measures) play a key role in providing security. The con-
cept of expert-led securitization simultaneously broad-
ens and narrows the scope of Elbe’s medicalization of se-
curity. It narrows the focus to increased roles of medical
professionals without making grander claims about a re-
definition in general of insecurity as a medical problem.
It broadens the scope by identifying distinct phases of
expert involvement in securitization processes and intro-
ducing a framework that extends beyond health issues.
To provide insights into the policymaking dynamics
underlying expert-led securitization, we find inspiration
in Kingdon’s ‘multiple streams framework’ from 1984
(Kingdon, 2014). The framework conceptualizes policies
as the result of couplings between three ‘streams’ with
separate and independent dynamics and rules: (i) The
problem recognition stream where issues that require
attention are identified and effective solutions outlined;
(ii) the policy/solution stream characterized by a ‘policy
primeval soup’ where many policy solutions are continu-
ously simmering but where a few manage to be turned
into concrete policy ideas by invested key stakeholders;
and (iii) the political stream that encompasses the mo-
tives and opportunities of policymakers to advocate for a
particular policy idea (Kingdon, 2014). We use the frame-
work’s three streams as a loose typological frame to illus-
trate situations where experts can exercise control over
the securitization process.
Securitizing speech acts—that is, the framing of a so-
cietal condition as an existential threat, and thus, elevat-
ing it on the national policy agenda—take place in the
political stream. The securitization of a threat must fig-
ure prominently on the policy agenda to gain the atten-
tion of the desired audiences for acceptance and tomerit
extraordinary means. Eriksson (1999) rightly argues that
“anyone may securitize an issue, but only a few put a se-
curitized issue onto the governmental agenda” (p. 11).
We are interested in this form of securitization, initiated
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by high-level politicians with the purpose of placing the
issue on the political agenda.
Actors may continuously frame different conditions
as existential threats, but the multiple streams approach
suggests that more than successful framing is needed
for these potential threats to rise on the policy agenda;
to be accepted by the relevant audience; and to fos-
ter extraordinary policies that can effectively deal with
the threats. Within the multiple streams framework, so-
called policy entrepreneurs champion attention to spe-
cific problems, match them with possible solutions, and
launch the resulting policies into the political approval
process when there is a window of opportunity for do-
ing so (Kingdon, 2014). In securitization processes, such
policy entrepreneurs need not be political leaders. These
policy entrepreneurs championing political attention to
certain issues as well as particular courses of action can
be situated in departments, agencies, or even bodies out-
side of national governments. Groundwork for securitiz-
ing specific threats does not depend on political leaders
but their security framing is essential to elevate policy op-
tions into formal policymaking. In the multiple streams
framework, much of that groundwork is located in the
policy stream where departments, agencies, think tanks,
university researchers, and others with ideas about what
policies should be enacted develop and debate them in
technical terms. And once the securitizing speech act
has been delivered by senior leaders, the process of
developing the extraordinary means for responding to
securitized issues moves into specific policy enactment
and implementation.
A distinctive insight of expert-led securitization is
that the top-tier decision makers who initiate the securi-
tization of a threat through their speech acts are not nec-
essarily the same actors that dominate the subsequent
policy process by defining the policy content. The reason
is a policy vacuum that allows experts to define the con-
tents of public policy, which is often particularly promi-
nent in health threats (Eriksson, 1999). As described in
some detail by Elbe (2011, p. 855), medical experts have
“been granted enhanced powers for controlling and mit-
igating pandemic threats through existing institutions”
allowing them to extend “their influence more deeply
into the domains of foreign and security policy” (Elbe,
2011, p. 862). Strong forces in the policy stream pull
health experts into such policy processes and push politi-
cians out. Public health agencies and departments of
health involved in the administrative process of health
threat securitization are not just populated by general
bureaucrats with backgrounds in political science, eco-
nomics, law, and similar degrees. Rather, public health
agencies employ health practitioners and researchers
(such as epidemiologists, virologists, and medical infec-
tious disease specialist). The professional recruitment
and organizational culture of most public health agen-
cies differ from generalist agencies, and they enjoy con-
siderable autonomous authority (Boswell, 2009). In ad-
dition, politicians are eager to delegate responsibility in
situations of low political rewards but high political risks
(Boin, McConnell, & Hart, 2008; Hood, 2010; Moynihan,
2012). Health threats can be contentious political issues
where the remedies (e.g., vaccinations, isolation, quar-
antines, and school closures) carry substantial political
risks. Sweden’s extensive vaccination campaign during
the 2009 influenza, for example, was publicly questioned
in subsequent years because the vaccinations had the
unintended consequence of increasing the prevalence of
narcolepsy in the population (World Health Organization,
2011). Politicians are often likely to be punished for mis-
managing a health threat either by overreaching or un-
derestimating the response (Baekkeskov & Rubin, 2014;
Boin et al., 2008; Rubin, 2020).
Thus, inspired by the multiple stream framework,
three analytical stages of expert-led securitization can be
identified, with implications for our cases:
First, initiation: Aligned with conventional Copenha-
gen School theory, securitization of a threat is initiated
through speech acts by leading politicians. In the pol-
icy stream, experts can exercise control over policy con-
tents in the process of securitization. However, experts
are unlikely to be able to initiate securitization without
active backing fromkeypolitical actors. Concretely, there-
fore, the first step in a securitization process analysis is
to apply the more conventional Copenhagen School the-
ory to determine whether the securitization of a threat
has been initiated through speech acts. Securitization of
infectious disease threats, therefore, is initiated in the
political stream by political leaders. For the 2009 H1N1
pandemic, this means that we should observe that the
framing 2009 H1N1 as a security threat was performed
as speech acts by leading politicians.
Second, process: After securitizing speech acts, ex-
perts will be the primary drivers and administrators of
the securitization processes. This implies that key secu-
ritization decisions can be traced back to experts. Once
the securitization process has been initiated in the polit-
ical stream, the question becomes who dominates the
policy stream: do the political leaders insist on owner-
ship over the policy process or is there room for the ex-
perts to encroach on this stream? The policy steam of
securitization is dominated by experts from the problem
stream rather than politicians from the political stream.
Thus, securitization of infectious disease threats is pro-
cessed in the policy stream, which in turn is populated
almost entirely by public health expert organizations and
individuals. Political leaders are not much invested in the
policy process and there is ample room for the experts
to manage the process. For the 2009 H1N1 pandemic,
this means that we should observe that policies and pro-
grams for combatting 2009 H1N1 were developed by
public health agencies and experts, with minimal partici-
pation from politicians or other actors.
Third, policy: According to conventional Copenhagen
School theory, one would expect similar speech acts
would produce policies that are extraordinary. The cen-
tral causal claim of Copenhagen School theory is that
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successful securitization leads to extraordinary policies.
However, the policies that result from expert-driven pro-
cesses may be substantially different. Similar securitiza-
tion discourses and framings on the political level do not
mean that all jurisdictions will enact the same policies
and programs to combat that threat because the actual
policy content is defined in the subsequent, expert-led
processes. In politically led processes, the same polit-
ical actors responsible for the securitizing speech acts
also dominate the policy stream, which naturally leads
to greater congruence between speech acts and actual
policy outcomes. Similar securitization framings across
countries would thus result in the same types of extraor-
dinary means. Expert-led securitization adds an interme-
dia variable to the policy stream that distorts the causal
mechanism between speech acts and policy because of
their substantial and autonomous influence on policy.
For the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, this means that we should
be able to find different (extraordinary or not) policies
subsequent to similar speech acts.
Table 1 below summarizes the three stages of expert-
led securitization.
3. Expert-Led Securitization in Denmark and Sweden
during the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic
Drawing on the approach of expert-led securitization,
the following analysis of the securitization processes in
Denmark and Sweden is structured according to the
three analytical stages developedpreviously: (i) Initiation
of securitization by speech acts elevating pandemics to
existential threats; (ii) expert involvement in processes
of securitization in the two countries; and (iii) policies
following from these two distinct processes of securiti-
zation. First, we briefly outline our research design.
3.1. Most-Similar Case Design
Denmark’s and Sweden’s responses to 2009 H1N1
are particularly useful to compare because these
Scandinavian neighbors share many political and social
characteristics. The countries are similarly situated in
Northern Europe, which means that their populations
are exposed in the same ways to fast-spreading infec-
tious diseases such as influenza. Because of continu-
ous traffic across the border between the two neigh-
bors, such diseases can easily spread directly from one
to the other. Denmark and Sweden are well known for
sharing linguistic and cultural characteristics. In addition,
their political and social policy systems are similar. Both
are democracies with proportional representation ruled
from one parliamentary chamber, often by multi-party
coalitions. Neither had national or local elections during
2009 or early 2010, so pandemic response was not po-
sitioned to become an election issue. Both have welfare
states of the Social Democratic variety that includes uni-
versal health care (Esping-Andersen, 2015),making them
similarly capable of managing infectious disease cases.
Both are very wealthy coordinated market economies
(Hall & Soskice, 2003), giving themsimilar financial capac-
ity to purchase drugs and technologies to counter novel
diseases. Hence, comparing these two countries controls
a variety of factors that can plausibly explain variation in
public policies against pandemic influenza (i.e., they are
most-similar systems; Przeworski & Teune, 1970). In turn,
thismeans that, a priori, we could reasonably expect that
the two countries would similarly securitize the same in-
fectious disease event happening at the same time.
The present analysis uses primary data from news-
paper articles, policy documents, and eight in-depth
research interviews conducted with key Danish and
Swedish officials involved in deciding their respective
countries’ 2009 H1N1 pandemic responses (see Box 1).
The media articles were selected using print media
databases (Retriever Research in Sweden and Infomedia
in Denmark) through key search words such as ‘H1N1’
or ‘swine flu.’ The policy documents encompass inter-
nal and external evaluations, white papers, press re-
leases and press briefing transcripts. Interviewees were
identified through analyses of documents and reports
on the 2009 H1N1 events and referrals from prelimi-
nary informational conversations and earlier interviews.
Interviews were conducted and recorded in 2013, 2014,
and 2019. They were structured and open-ended using
the same interview guide for all, with adjustments only
for the specific positions and formal roles during 2009
of the interviewees. Each interview lasted between one
and two hours. Most interviews were conducted face to
face, and one interview used herewas conducted by tele-
phone. Each interview was transcribed.
Table 1. Expert-led securitization stages.
Securitization stages Expert-led securitization
Initiation The threat is securitized through speech-acts on the political level.
Process Experts define the contents of securitization, and other actors defer to expert judgments
and advice.
Policies Dissimilar policies can follow from similar securitizing speech-acts across countries, due to
differences in expert advice and judgments. Notably, this means that policies may or may
not be extraordinary.
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Box 1. List of interviewees.
1. Fisker, Jesper. 7 March 2014. Former Director of Sundhedsstyrelsen, Denmark.
2. Jensen, Ole A. 15 October 2013. Head of Administration, Statens Seruminstitut, Denmark.
3. Nielsen, Jacob A. 11 April 2014. Former Minister of Health for Denmark.
4. Mølbak, Kåre. 19 February 2019. Former State Epidemiologist, Statens Seruminstitut, Denmark.
5. Örtqvist, Åke. 5 September 2014. Medical Officer for Stockholm County, Sweden.
6. Pedersen, Nils S. 20 November 2013. Director of Statens Seruminstitut, Denmark.
7. Smith, Else. 12 November 2013. Former Head of the Infectious Diseases Unit, Sundhedsstyrelsen, Denmark.
8. Tegnell, Anders. 9 September 2014. Former Head of the Infectious Diseases Unit, Socialstyrelsen, Sweden.
3.2. Initiation: How Pandemics and the 2009 H1N1 Were
Elevated to Existential Threats
The growing literature on securitization of infec-
tious disease outbreaks and pandemics generally con-
cludes that such events became securitized during the
2000s. Existing studies show this through a variety
of methodological approaches and levels of analysis
(Abraham, 2011; Davies, 2008; Elbe, 2009; Kamradt-
Scott & Lee, 2011; McInnes & Lee, 2006; Watterson &
Kamradt-Scott, 2016). Most notably, the 2007 World
Health Organization annual health report character-
ized pandemic influenza as the most feared security
threat facing the world (World Health Organization,
2007). There is also evidence that the 2009 H1N1 in-
fluenza outbreak and subsequent pandemic was se-
curitized through speech acts. Using the conventional
Copenhagen School approach, Abraham (2011) shows
that the 2009 H1N1 pandemic was securitized through
a global effort. Similarly, Kittelsen concludes that the
threat was repeatedly framed in security terms within
the EU, and that the H1N1 pandemic “reinforced the se-
curitization process already underway” (Kittelsen, 2013,
p. 232).
On 25 April 2009, the World Health Organization
alerted the world at large about the outbreak by declar-
ing a Public Health Emergency of International Concern
(the first such declaration ever; Hanrieder & Kreuder-
Sonnen, 2014), which is a formal declaration of an
extraordinary event considered to constitute a public
health risk. This was followed on 11 June 2009 by the
World Health Organization’s declaration that 2009 H1N1
now constituted a pandemic. The 2009 H1N1 outbreak
and development into a pandemic specifically became
the subject for speech acts by political leaders, combin-
ing alarm and reassurance.
Sweden’s then Minister of Health and Aging Maria
Larsson on 27 April broke off a visit to China to attend
an emergency meeting of health ministers of the EU
on the H1N1 outbreak and described that the relevant
Swedish agencies were meeting continuously and that
H1N1 was on the cabinet’s daily agenda. Yet she em-
phasized that “the Swedish people can feel safe know-
ing that Sweden has the highest preparedness” (Sveriges
Television, 2009a, authors’ translation). Similarly, react-
ing to theWorld Health Organization’s pandemic declara-
tion on 11 June 2009, Larsson underscored that response
“is about planning so that the health care system works,
so that the elder care system works, so that energy
production works,” but she also reassured Swedes that
“nothing alarming has actually happened. Sweden has
the situation under control” (Sveriges Television, 2009b,
authors’ translation).
Denmark also saw public reassurances in the
midst moving to emergency measures. To illustrate, a
Danish tabloid article headed “Danes Can Die in Their
Thousands” reported that “doctors and authorities have
begun a desperate race with time” including “a two
and a half hour crisis meeting” of Denmark’s Pandemic
Group; yet theMinister of Health Jacob Axel Nielsen was
also cited, offering reassurance that “there is nothing to
fear” and “swine flu is no more dangerous than a sum-
mer flu, and there is medicine for one million Danes if
it should be needed” (Barfoed, 2009, authors’ transla-
tions). Indeed, Nielsen and others have revealed in sub-
sequent research interviews that the government and its
public health agencies deliberately sought to diffuse any
sense of panic about 2009 H1N1 through coordinated
and calming public messages (Fisker interview, 2014;
Nielsen interview, 2014).
The push to securitize pandemics in the new millen-
nium had elevated outbreaks of novel influenzas to se-
vere threats (Kittelsen, 2013; World Health Organization,
2007). TheWorld Health Organization’s declarations had
raised alert levels, which national media in turn com-
municated to publics across the world. Such alerts sig-
naled an imminent and potentially deadly threat to pub-
lic safety. Hence, political leaders facing the 2009 H1N1
outbreak had to react publicly to them by acknowledg-
ing the potential severity of the new virus and engag-
ing in emergency deliberations about response actions
within public health agencies and departments. In pub-
lic messages, national politicians were also reacting to
the situation by communicating that government was in
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control, rather than enhancing the impression of impend-
ing doom. The combination of alarm and public reassur-
ances thus elevated the 2009 H1N1 outbreak to a crisis
event with implications for public safety.
3.3. Process: How National Experts Steered 2009 H1N1
Response Policymaking and Policies
The previous section showed that in Sweden and
Denmark, 2009 H1N1 was elevated to the status of a
threat to public safety by securitization of pandemics
generally in the years prior to 2009, global alerts and
news about the outbreak and spread of a new H1N1
influenza strain during 2009 and reassuring public mes-
sages by senior elected officials in the wake of these
developments. To understand how government action
can follow from such issue elevation, this section traces
the administrative processes involved in 2009 H1N1
response-making in Denmark and Sweden.
Like many other countries, the governments of
Sweden and Denmark responded to the threat of a
coming influenza pandemic by authoring national strate-
gies for how to respond. While these national pan-
demic preparedness processes had several iterations
starting around 2003, the Danish and Swedish strategies
in place prior to the April 2009 H1N1 outbreakwere final-
ized in 2006 (Socialstyrelsen, 2006; Sundhedsstyrelsen,
2006). As detailed by Baekkeskov (2016a, 2016b), key
ideas about the pandemic threat settled in these pre-
pandemic preparations informed how national public
health experts thought about the actual pandemic that
unfolded from late April 2009. The preparations created
a crucial difference between how Sweden and Denmark
considered the pandemic threat, which was carried for-
ward by the respective national public health experts
into 2009 H1N1 response (Baekkeskov, 2016a, 2016b). In
Denmark, pandemic flu was conceptualized primarily as
‘a threat to lives,’ and mostly those of people with pre-
existing health conditions (i.e., risk groups). In Sweden,
pandemic flu was conceptualized as ‘a threat to social
continuity’ (disruption to public health, workforce par-
ticipation, businesses, social services, etc.). These dif-
ferent threat conceptions led to significantly different
uses for vaccination (i.e., the ultimate measure against
flu). The Danish plan focused on identifying the groups
most at-risk of death and severe effects and directing
available vaccines to these groups. The Swedish plan fo-
cused on limiting expected social disruptions by direct-
ing vaccines to at-risk groups as a first stage in vaccinat-
ing the whole population. These different expectations
for what was still an unknown future event were made
concrete as each country negotiated an ‘advance pur-
chase agreement’ (finalised in 2006/2007) with the phar-
maceutical company GSK for guaranteed deliveries of
pandemic flu vaccine if the World Health Organization
declared a full-scale pandemic (as happened on 11
June 2009). Denmark’s advance purchase agreement se-
cured vaccines for at most 42 percent of its popula-
tion (Sundhedsstyrelsen, 2011). Sweden’s advance pur-
chase agreement secured vaccines for up to 100 percent
of its population (Myndigheten för Samhällsskydd och
Beredskap, 2011).
The first stage of the 2009 H1N1 response by Danish
and Swedish departments and agencies began on 25
April (Myndigheten för Samhällsskydd och Beredskap,
2011; Sundhedsstyrelsen, 2011). Each country’s national
board of health tasked specific units to set up new
monitoring and epidemiological surveillance activities fo-
cused on H1N1. Within days of 25 April, each also began
national-level deliberations about how to respond be-
tween various agencies and summoned experts (Mølbak
interview, 2019; Smith interview, 2013; Tegnell inter-
view, 2014). The national boards of health immediately
ramped up emergency operations centers and similar
facilities. Regular agency staff were seconded to these
on a 24/7 basis, including epidemiologists and virolo-
gists who could track how the outbreak spread as well
as its public health implications. Hence, within Sweden’s
Socialstyrelsen and Smittskydsinstitutt, staff were imme-
diately assigned to be on top of the H1N1 outbreak
(Myndigheten för Samhällsskydd och Beredskap, 2011;
Tegnell interview, 2014). For the same exact reasons and
tasks, staff in Denmark’s Sundhedsstyrelse and Statens
Seruminstitut were mobilized (Mølbak interview, 2019;
Smith interview, 2013; Sundhedsstyrelsen, 2011).
The second stage of the administrative response be-
gan when the World Health Organization declared on
11 June 2009 that the novel H1N1 outbreak had be-
come a full-blown pandemic. In Denmark and Sweden,
the public health agencies faced an extraordinary impact.
Before 2009, both countries had signed contracts with
GSK, a pharmaceuticals producer, for vaccines against
pandemic flu (Jensen interview, 2013; Myndigheten för
Samhällsskydd och Beredskap, 2011; Sundhedsstyrelsen,
2011). These Advance Purchase Agreements included
terms that pandemic vaccine purchases would be trig-
gered if the World Health Organization declared a full
(‘level 6’) pandemic. Each set of decision-makers was
contractually obliged to make a purchase order within
few weeks of the pandemic declaration. This meant that
Sweden and Denmark’s respective governments had to
decide and place a precise order of vaccines from GSK in
the weeks following 11 June 2009.
Formally, political leaders were responsible for pan-
demic vaccine purchases in June 2009 and allocations of
vaccines to population subgroups in subsequent months.
However, close studies of Danish and Swedish 2009
H1N1 vaccination policymaking have shown that elected
officials in both countries consistently and without ex-
ception followed the advice received from the national
experts and agencies as they decided and approved poli-
cies (Baekkeskov, 2016a, 2016b; Baekkeskov & Öberg,
2017). In Sweden, the national agencies were advis-
ing and coordinating actions across Sweden’s 21 coun-
ties (mediated by the Swedish Association of Local
Authorities and Regions), rather than through central
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state action. In practice, much of the decision-making
about how to implement pandemic response depended
on advice from the counties’ Medical Officers (Mølbak
interview, 2019; Myndigheten för Samhällsskydd och
Beredskap, 2011; Tegnell interview, 2014; Örtqvist in-
terview, 2014). These individual experts and officials
made their own judgments about how to prioritize ac-
cess to vaccination and other treatments. Hence, while
all Swedes eventually gained access to pandemic flu
vaccinations and through their primary care clinics,
the timing of rollouts and details of who was priori-
tized could vary between the counties (Myndigheten
för Samhällsskydd och Beredskap, 2011; Tegnell inter-
view, 2014). In Denmark, formal policymaking was en-
tirely national. Hence, Sundhedsstyrelsen’s and Statens
Seruminstitut’s experts interacted with the Minister
of Health, who had direct policy responsibility, as
well as informing national politicians from the vari-
ous political parties represented in the Danish parlia-
ment. Sundhedsstyrelsen, in consultation with Statens
Seruminstitut experts on infectious diseases and vacci-
nation protocols, managed Denmark’s pandemic vaccine
rollout and prioritization schedule (Pedersen interview,
2013; Smith interview, 2013).
Prior studies show that key ideas about pandemic
threats and vaccination uses dominated expert thinking
about 2009 H1N1 response. Despite intense months of
sense-making and information gathering after the April
outbreak, national expert guidance in each response
stage closely followed the ideas about the pandemic
threat and the uses of vaccination that had been settled
during national pandemic planning (Baekkeskov, 2016b;
Baekkeskov & Öberg, 2017). Hence, in line with their
preparations (previously described), Danish experts ad-
vised the national government to purchase vaccines for
about 28 percent of the population, and subsequently
to focus only on groups most at-risk of severe complica-
tions (Sundhedsstyrelsen, 2011). In contrast, but in line
with their own preparations, Swedish experts advised
county governments to purchase vaccines for everyone,
and to roll out vaccination to the whole population
(Myndigheten för Samhällsskydd och Beredskap, 2011).
In turn, the respective governments followed and imple-
mented their experts’ advice without alteration—that is,
formal authority gave way to epistemic dominance in
the policy stream to create the respective Danish and
Swedish responses and the differences between them.
This delegation constitutes an important trait of expert-
led securitization.
In addition to the appointed experts’ importance in
response-making, key experts from the national pub-
lic health agencies in Sweden and Denmark predomi-
nated in their respective national public debates about
2009 H1N1. Close comparisons of newspaper coverage
of 2009 H1N1 and related policy initiative in the two
countries during 2009 shows this (Baekkeskov & Öberg,
2017). For instance, 70 percent of the claims in the
Swedishmedia about vaccination policy during the H1N1
pandemic came from experts and less than 10 percent
could be traced back to politicians (the remaining claims
were made by civil society organizations or journalists;
Baekkeskov & Öberg, 2017).
In sum, analysis of expert involvement in the secu-
ritization process suggests a high degree of participation
and visibility in the decision-making process. Rather than
politicians dominating policymaking when it came to the
securitization process of transforming speech acts into
concrete extraordinary policies, it appears that experts
had a substantial influence on this process. In addition,
such influence was not indirect and covert; rather, the
public discourse openly recognized the health agencies
as key players.
3.4. Policy: Similar Speech Acts of Securitization Had
Different Policy Outcomes
Sweden and Denmark both took policy measures in
the wake of speech acts that securitized 2009 H1N1.
Both countries used information-based initiatives fo-
cusing on hand washing and other hygiene measures
(Myndigheten för Samhällsskydd och Beredskap, 2011),
and opened government stores of antiviral medication
(Vilhelmsson & Mulinari, 2018).
However, the countries took measures in different
degrees. As described, the public discourse on Danish
and Swedish responses to 2009 H1N1 was dominated
by a small handful of national experts. But while sim-
ilarly influential, these expert sources carried very dif-
ferent messages in the two countries. Swedish experts
emphasized the danger to all of society from the pan-
demic, and the need for everyone to participate by ac-
cepting vaccination (Baekkeskov & Öberg, 2017). In con-
trast, their Danish counterparts emphasized that the pan-
demic only posed a danger to people with certain med-
ical conditions, and that everyone without these con-
ditions could rely on general hygiene and regular flu
treatments (i.e., bedrest and plenty of fluids). Similarly,
each country’s critical policies, particularly on vaccina-
tions, differed. Sweden’s main policy response was in-
tense and universal—a general vaccination campaign
that developed in stages to include all residents (e.g.,
Myndigheten för Samhällsskydd och Beredskap, 2011).
Denmark’s main policy response was moderate and
targeted—vaccination was offered only to highly at-risk
groups (e.g., Sundhedsstyrelsen, 2011). Despite similar
speech acts securitizing the pandemic, the subsequent
process of securitization thus differed. That is, they ex-
posed their respective populations to disease risk in sub-
stantively and significantly different ways.
Some scholars have criticized the conventional
Copenhagen School for being ambiguous with regards
what constitutes an extraordinary response, particularly
in non-military contexts (Williams, 2015). However, it is
safe to say that the Swedish response was significantly
more extraordinary than the Danish in that Sweden mo-
bilized society and attempted general mass vaccination
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while Denmark issued warnings to at-risk groups and at-
tempted targeted vaccination. If the term ‘extraordinary
responses’ in the context of health threats is to retain
analytical value, then a previously unscheduled and na-
tionwide vaccination campaign for all residents must be
considered highly extraordinary. In contrast, offering vac-
cines to high-risk groups (something most countries do
anyway in influenza season) is considerably less abnor-
mal (though clearly extraordinary in the sense of being
previously unscheduled). This significant variation in re-
sponses cannot be explained by considering speech acts
in isolation. But as shown, accounts of the administrative
process surrounding the securitizing speech acts is better
equipped to explain variations in extraordinary policies.
Table 2 below summarizes the key empirical findings
according to the three stages of expert-led securitization.
4. Conclusion: Securitization through Initiating Speech
Acts and Expert-Led Administrative Processes
The Danish and Swedish cases of 2009 H1N1 influenza
pandemic responses show the utility of investigating ad-
ministrative processes to chart the policy dimensions
of securitization. We see the importance of administra-
tive practices for the securitization process in Denmark
and Sweden during 2009. We see it in the details of
how the pandemic was securitized in practice, as a semi-
automated and technocratic process that linked pan-
demic planning and preparations made before anyone
had heard of 2009 H1N1. And we see it in the general
deference by the elected politicians with formal power
and responsibility to judgements developed at theWorld
Health Organization and by national experts. Notably,
Denmark and Sweden differed little in terms of how
much they relied on administrative practices to securi-
tize the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. Where the two adminis-
trative processes differed was in the core ideas that they
relied on in order to formulate concrete responses to the
securitization of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. This led to
two very different policy responses where the Swedish
was arguably highly extraordinarywhereas the Danish re-
sponse was far more in line with normal politics.
Understanding the practice of securitization, there-
fore, depends on more than study of speech acts by
elected officials. This article has shown that if wewant to
understand both the elevation of an event to an existen-
tial threat and the development of extraordinary policies
to counter the threat, analysis of the administrative pro-
cesses that surround or follow such speech acts can be
necessary. This argument appears even more relevant in
the light of the plethora of extraordinary (and some not
so extraordinary) policies that have been implemented
in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. In the securitizing
process, the roles and insights of key experts and expert
agencies—in this case of biomedical and other disease
experts organized in public health agencies—can be par-
ticularly powerful. While speech acts by the respective
healthministers played a key role in elevating 2009 H1N1
as a threat to public safety on the respective national
agendas, this study shows that the actual response poli-
cies were differently extraordinary, which was largely de-
termined by the key Swedish and Danish experts. Expert-
led securitization processes are thus capable of explain-
ing securitization of public health issues and qualifying
how extraordinary measures taken to mitigate them are.
5. Postscript on Covid-19
While this article was in review, the world experienced
Covid-19, which is arguably the worst pandemic in a cen-
Table 2. Summary of findings supporting expert-led securitization during the 2009 pandemics.
Securitization stages Expert-led securitization The 2009 pandemic case-study
Initiation The threat is securitized through speech-acts Pandemics had been increasingly securitized by
in the political stream. key actors up through the 2000s.
The 2009 pandemic was framed by political
leaders as a potential existential threat both
internationally and in Denmark and Sweden.
Process Experts define the contents of securitization, The securitization administrative process was
and other actors defer to expert judgments primarily driven by field experts working in key
and advice. health agencies.
Politicians had limited engagement with the
process, turning to the national experts to
guide actions
Policies Extraordinary but dissimilar policies can follow Following their respective experts’ advice,
from similar speech-acts across countries, due Sweden implemented pandemic vaccination
to differences in expert advice and judgments. for the general population while Denmark
implemented a targeted policy of vaccinating
about twenty percent of the population.
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tury. Naturally, the new pandemic will produce new em-
pirical evidence that will allow us to revisit and nuance
themes and findings of this article. From the face of it
(we have yet to engage in a thorough analysis), it does
appear that the central tenets of this article are sup-
ported by the recent developments. Covid-19 unequivo-
cally puts to rest the question of whether pandemics can
be securitized. Almost all political leaders have framed
the pandemic as an existential threat, the public has
broadly accepted this framing, and governments have
implemented the most extraordinary measures seen in
peace time. However, this article went further and dis-
cussed a certain type of securitization: expert-led securi-
tization. Experts undoubtedly play significant roles in the
policy stream in the present situation. But the scope of
the pandemic has also forced politicians to take more
active roles in many countries. Such more complex se-
curitization processes only underline the importance of
addressing the administrative processes of securitization
when trying to explain the plethora of different strate-
gies that have resulted from rather similar securitiza-
tion framings. Returning to the case-countries in this ar-
ticle, Denmark appeared to follow a mixed securitization
process where politicians and experts both had promi-
nent roles. Sweden appeared more unique because its
politicians explicitly left Covid-19 policymaking to the
experts thereby displaying a high degree of expert-led
securitization. We are hopeful that more comparative
research on this topic will soon emerge, and that the
new pandemic will spur greater interest in the process
of securitization.
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